In the last years, side-channel resilience of lattice-based schemes has shown to be an active field of research, driven by the generally limited performance of their side-channel secure implementations. In this work, we introduced new security definitions that add resistance against probing attacks for Ind-CPA and Ind-CCA schemes, and show that the Naor-Yung transform extends to these new notions without any overhead contrary to the Fujisaki-Okamoto transfom. This new tool allows us to construct probing-secure schemes in new ways, which we use to build Rutile and Topaz, two probing-secure lattice-based schemes inspired from Kyber and Raccoon.
Laz Panard is a third-year Ph.D. student in lattice-based cryptography under the supervision of Katharina Boudgoust and Laurent Imbert. She works at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France and is part of the Exact Computing (ECO) team, in Montpellier. Laz focuses on the design and security properties of lattice-based cryptographic schemes, and more recently on designing schemes that are side-channel resistant "by design".